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Abstract
In this paper, downlink secure transmission in simultaneous information and power transfer (SWIPT)
system enabled with massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is studied. A base station (BS)
with a large number of antennas transmits energy and information signals to its intended users, but
these signals are also received by an active eavesdropper. The users and eavesdropper employ a power
splitting technique to simultaneously decode information and harvest energy. Massive MIMO helps the
BS to focus energy to the users and prevent information leakage to the eavesdropper. The harvested
energy by each user is employed for decoding information and transmitting uplink pilot signals for
channel estimation. It is assumed that the active eavesdropper also harvests energy in the downlink
and then contributes during the uplink training phase. Achievable secrecy rate is considered as the
performance criterion and a closed-form lower bound for it is derived. To provide secure transmission,
the achievable secrecy rate is then maximized through an optimization problem with constraints on
the minimum harvested energy by the user and the maximum harvested energy by the eavesdropper.
Numerical results show the effectiveness of using massive MIMO in providing physical layer security
in SWIPT systems and also show that our closed-form expressions for the secrecy rate are accurate.
Index Terms
Active eavesdropper, Energy harvesting (EH), Massive MIMO, Non-linear energy harvesting (EH),
Physical layer security, Power splitting (PS), Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT)
2I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, employing energy harvesting techniques has been regarded as a promising approach
to prolong the lifetime of wireless low power networks. These techniques are useful in many
applications including wireless communications in extreme environments, sensor networks, and
medical Internet of Things (m-IoT) applications [1]–[3]. Traditional renewable energy sources
such as solar and wind energy are weather dependent and not available everywhere and anytime.
Thus, energy harvesting from ambient radio frequency (RF) signals has recently drawn a sig-
nificant research interest due to many practical advantages, such as wide operating range, being
predictable, low production cost, small receiver form factor, and efficient energy multicasting
thanks to the broadcast nature of electromagnetic (EM) waves [1]–[6]. The wide coverage of
cellular communication networks, and the need for powering a massive number of low-power IoT
devices in the next generations of wireless networks provide an opportunity for RF-based power
transfer techniques to be considered as a prominent and scalable solution. The conventional role
of RF signals as information carrier has attracted attention to simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) as an emerging technology to solve the energy supply problem
in power- constrained networks. In SWIPT systems, two architectures of separated and hybrid
receivers have been proposed for information decoding and energy harvesting. In the separated
architecture, the information and energy receivers operate separately [7]–[9], whereas in the
hybrid architecture a common receiver is used for both harvesting energy and information
decoding. In this architecture, the signal which is used for decoding the information cannot
be reused for harvesting the energy due to hardware limitations [10]. Thus, the received signal
has to be split into two parts, one for information decoding and another for energy harvesting.
Time switching and power splitting are two common hybrid receiver architectures in the literature
[11]–[14]. On the other hand, in SWIPT systems, the RF energy harvesting in the receiver is
generally modeled by two linear and non-linear models which the non-linear model is more
practical [4], [15]–[21].
Since RF signals significantly attenuate over distance, improving energy transfer efficiency is a
great challenge for deploying SWIPT systems over wide areas and especially in applications like
IoT. To improve the efficiency of energy transfer in SWIPT systems, various techniques can be
adopted. In [22], [23], the authors propose methods based on using relay techniques to achieve
this goal. Another solution for improving the efficiency of energy transfer is using massive
3multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO). By employing a large number of antennas, massive
MIMO can provide extremely narrow beams towards desired users to efficiently transfer energy
to them. Even though massive MIMO can play a significant role in SWIPT systems, the research
in this area is in its infancy. SWIPT enabled massive MIMO systems have been investigated in
[12], [15], [16], [24]. In [12], a hybrid time switching and power splitting SWIPT protocol design
in a full-duplex massive MIMO system was proposed and the achievable rate was maximized by
optimizing transmit powers of the base station (BS). SWIPT for downlink of a multi-user massive
MIMO system was studied in [16] and its achievable rates were computed. In [15], a massive
MIMO SWIPT system assuming Rician fading channels was investigated and the approximate
achievable rate and harvested energy were derived. In [24], SWIPT in a 3D massive MIMO
system was studied and the BS antenna’s tilt was optimized jointly with power allocation and
power splitting ratios in order to increase SWIPT efficiency.
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channels, wireless networks are always vulnerable to
physical layer attacks including eavesdropping and jamming. This problem is more challenging
in SWIPT systems, since the transmitted energy can help the attackers. Traditionally, communica-
tion security relies on cryptography techniques. Encryption and decryption algorithms are usually
complex and energy consuming. Therefore, these techniques are not suitable to provide security
for use in energy limited networks and SWIPT systems. Physical layer security has recently
received significant research interests to guarantee secure communication in SWIPT systems by
utilizing physical properties of wireless channels such as channel fading, noise and interference
[25]–[29]. In [25], a secure transmission scheme was proposed by exploiting artificial noise. The
authors in [26] exploit the energy signal in addition to artificial noise to confound eavesdropper
and provide secure communication. In [27]–[30], security of communication in SWIPT systems
was provided by exploiting optimal beamforming design. Recently massive MIMO has attracted
attention to ensure security of transmission. Due to the high spatial resolution provided in massive
MIMO, information leakage to illegal receivers can be reduced [31]–[35]. However, a so called
pilot contamination attack in the training phase can help an active eavesdropper to wiretap the
signals in massive MIMO systems [35], [36]
In SWIPT systems, massive MIMO can combat eavesdropping in addition to improve energy
and information transfer efficiency. In spite of these advantages, research on this topic has
received scant attention and more research is necessary. In [9], a SWIPT system with massive
MIMO and separate energy and information receivers was considered. The effect of phase noise
4on the accuracy of channel state information estimation and information leakage to energy
receivers that are potential eavesdroppers, was studied in [9]. In [37], a multi-cell massive MIMO
system in the presence of a two-antenna active energy harvester was studied. The energy harvester
legitimately harvests energy via one antenna and illegitimately eavesdrops the signal transmitted
for information users via the other antenna. The power allocation for downlink transmission is
optimized according to the asymptotic lower bound on averaged harvested energy and ergodic
secrecy rate.
Motivated by the above works, in this paper, we study secure transmission in the downlink of a
multi-user massive MIMO SWIPT system. A BS is equipped with a large number of antennas
and simultaneously transmits energy and data signals to its intended users. In addition, an active
eavesdropper in the area wiretaps the signals transmitted by the BS. Each transmission phase
is composed of an uplink training (pilot transmission) phase and a downlink energy and data
signals transmission phase. In the uplink training phase, the users send their allocated pilots to
the BS and the BS uses them to estimate the users’ channels. We assume the system operates
in the time division duplex (TDD) mode and because of the channel reciprocity property, the
estimated uplink channels are then used by the BS for downlink beamforming design. To facilitate
eavesdropping, the eavesdropper contaminates the uplink training phase and sends a pilot signal
to the BS simultaneously with the users. In this network, both users and the active eavesdropper
employ the hybrid receivers and decode information and harvest energy by using a power splitting
method. In the above network, we analyze the achievable secrecy rate and derive an accurate
closed-form lower bound for it. Then, using the derived lower bound, the achievable secrecy
rate is maximized by proper choice of the power splitting ratio and the fraction of the harvested
energy allocated to the uplink pilot training. In the resulting optimization problem, we consider
constraints on the minimum harvested energy by the user and the maximum harvested energy by
the eavesdropper. Numerical results show that using massive MIMO can significantly enhance
the security performance of the SWIPT networks. We also show that the derived lower bound
is very close to the actual achievable secrecy rate.
Notation: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively.
The superscript (.), (.)T and (.)H represent conjugate, transpose and conjugate transpose,
respectively. (.)re and (.)im denote real part and imaginary part respectively. The notations ∣.∣
and ∥.∥ represent absolute value and 2-norm. E{.} and var(.) stand for expectation and variance
operations. CN(µ,σ2) denotes the circular symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean
5µ and covariance σ2. The notation [x]+ denotes max(x,0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A massive MIMO system consisting of a BS equipped with M antennas, K single antenna users
and an active eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1 is considered. The BS transmits data to the users
who are able to simultaneously decode the information and harvest energy from the radio signals.
Also, the eavesdropper illegally receives the transmitted signal and decodes information and
harvests energy. It is assumed that the BS, users and eavesdropper are synchronized and operate
using the TDD protocol. A frame-based transmission in one coherence interval T consisting
of two phases is considered. In the first phase with length τ (i.e. the training phase), the users
simultaneously transmit orthogonal pilots to the BS. Also, the eavesdropper which aims to receive
users information illegally, simultaneously transmits a pilot sequences to disturb the channel
estimation. Since the eavesdropper does not know the users’ pilot sequence, it chooses a random
pilot sequence uniformly distributed over the unit sphere [35].
After receiving the signals in this phase by the BS, uplink channels are estimated by the BS. The
BS then determines the downlink channel by assuming the channel reciprocity. In the next phase,
which is dedicated to data and energy transmission, the BS transmits information and energy
signals to the users using maximal ratio transmission (MRT), and users harvest the RF energy
from the BS and simultaneously decode information based on the following power-splitting
technique. In the assumed power splitting technique, the received signal is split into two power
streams with power splitting ratio 1−ρk and ρk for harvesting energy and decoding information,
respectively (0 < ρk < 1). The hybrid receiver is a generalization of a conventional information
receiver and an energy harvesting receiver. In particular, by setting the power splitting ratios
as ρk = 1 and ρk = 0, the hybrid receiver reduces to an information receiver and an energy
harvesting receiver, respectively.
Let gk =
√
βkhk denote the channel vector between the BS and the kth user, where βk
and hk ∼ CN(0,IM) represent the large scale fading and small scale fading of the channel,
respectively. Furthermore, gw =
√
βwhw is the channel vector between eavesdropper and BS
where βw and hw ∼ CN(0,IM) are the large scale fading and small scale fading of the channel,
respectively.
The channel between all users and the BS can be represented in matrix form as
G = HD
1
2 , (1)
6Fig. 1. System model of a SWIPT system consisting of a BS equipped with M antennas, K single antenna users and a single
antenna active eavesdropper. The BS has a continuous and stable power supply, while all the users and the eavesdropper operate
with the wireless EH.
where H = [h1, ...,hk, ...,hK] and D is a diagonal matrix whose elements [D]kk = βk.
A. Training Phase
The pilot sequences used by the users can be represented by an η ×K matrix √ηptΦ, where
φk, the kth user pilot sequence is the kth column of Φ, η represents the pilot sequence length
and ΦHΦ = Ik. The received signal at the BS is
Yt =
√
ηptGΦ
T +√ηqtgwφTw +N , (2)
where φw is active the eavesdropper’s pilot sequence and N is an M ×η noise matrix with i.i.d
CN(0, σ2) elements. The energy allocated to each pilot symbol by the users and eavesdropper
are denoted by pt and qt, respectively and defined as
pt =
θQNLk
η
(3)
qt =
ζQNLEve
η
, (4)
where QNL
k
and QNLEve are total harvested energy by the kth user and the eavesdropper, respectively.
The parameters θ ∈ [0,1] and ζ ∈ [0,1] denote the fraction of total harvested energy allocated to
7the pilot phase by the users and the eavesdropper, respectively.
The minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimate of G given Yt is [38]
Gˆ =
1√
ηpt
YtΦ
∗ (Ik + σ2 + qtβw
ηpt
D−1)−1 . (5)
Define E ≜ Gˆ −G. Then we have
σ2gˆk =
ηptβ
2
k
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk (6)
σ2ek =
(σ2 + qtβw)βk
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk , (7)
where σ2
gˆk
and σ2ek are the variances of the independent zero mean elements in the kth column
of Gˆ and E , respectively.
B. Data and Energy Transmission Phase
In this phase, BS transmits information and energy signals to all users using MRT precoding
which is optimal precoding in the massive MIMO regime [39]. The energy signal is a pseu-
dorandom signal which is perfectly known at the transmitter and the users. It does not carry
any information and it is transmitted by the BS not only to harvest more energy by the users
but also to confound the eavesdropper. An eavesdropper that interfered in the training phase and
succeeded in redirecting the signal beam toward itself, can harvest energy and decode information
illegally in this phase. The received signal by the kth user and eavesdropper can be expressed
respectively as
yk = g
H
k
K∑
i=1
wi (si +wEi) + nant,k (8)
yEve = g
H
w
K∑
i=1
wi (si +wEi) + nant,Eve (9)
where sk ∈ C and wEk ∈ C denote the information and energy symbols for the kth user. Without
loss of generality, it is assumed that E{∥sk∥2} = 1 and E{sk} = 0. Also, E{∥wEk∥2} = WE and
E{wEk} = 0. Furthermore, wk = gˆk√
E{∥gˆk∥2} represents the MRT precoding vector of the kth
user. Also, nant,k ∼ CN(0, σ2ant) and nant,Eve ∼ CN(0, σ2ant) denote additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at each receiver and eavesdropper, respectively.
8III. HARVESTED ENERGY AND ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In this section, averaged harvested energy and achievable secrecy rate are analysed and lower
bounds on achievable secrecy rate is derived. Achievable secrecy rate is a common criterion to
assess security of transmission and defined as the rate difference between the main channel from
the BS to the user and the wiretap channel from the BS to the eavesdropper.
A. Average Harvested Energy
In this section, the harvested energy and achievable secrecy rate are analyzed and lower
bound on achievable secrecy rate is derived. Achievable secrecy rate is a common metric to
assess security of transmission and defined as the rate difference between the main channel from
the BS to the user and the wiretap channel from the BS to the eavesdropper.
B. Average Harvested Energy
The received signal is split into two power streams with power splitting ratios ρk and 1 − ρk
to respectively decode information and harvest energy by the k’th user [16]. Also, the received
signal is split into two power streams with power splitting ratios ρEve and 1 − ρEve by the
eavesdropper. The harvested energy by receivers in SWIPT systems is modeled either as ideal
linear [15], [16] or more realistically using non-linear models [18], [19]. In the non-linear model,
the sensitivity of the energy harvester is limited [20]. Thus, the harvested energy is modeled
using the logistic (or sigmoid) function at the users and eavesdropper as follows [20], [21].
QNLk =
Psk
exp(a × b) ×
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢⎣
1 + exp(a × b)
1 + exp (−a([PEHk − PSEN]+ − b)) − 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (T − τ), (10)
QNLEve =
PsEve
exp(a × b) × [ 1 + exp(a × b)1 + exp (−a([PEHEve − PSEN]+ − b)) − 1] (T − τ), (11)
where Psk and PsEve denotes the maximum amount of harvested power when the EH circuit
is saturated at the users and eavesdropper, respectively. Here, a and b are positive constants
related to the circuit specification. PSEN denotes the EH sensitivity, that is, the harvester can
only collect the RF energy when the input power is greater than PSEN . It is assumed that all
the users and eavesdropper apply the same non-linear energy harvester. The harvested energy
is used for information decoding and pilot transmission in the next frame by the users and the
9eavesdropper. The PEHk and P
EH
Eve which are respectively the total harveted power at the k’th
user and eavesdropper can be expressed as
PEHk =(1 − ρk)E
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩∣g
H
k
K∑
i=1
wi (si +wEi) + nant,k∣
2⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ , (12)
PEHEve =(1 − ρEve)E
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩∣g
H
w
K∑
i=1
wi (si +wEi) + nant,Eve∣
2⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ . (13)
Theorem 1: By exploiting MRT precoding, the total received RF power by the k’th user and
eavesdropper can be respectively obtained as
PEHk = (1 − ρk)⎛⎝(Kβk +
Mηptβ
2
k
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk)(WE + 1) + σ2ant
⎞
⎠, (14)
PEHEve = (1 − ρEve)⎛⎝(Kβw +
K∑
i=1
Mqtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβi)(WE + 1) + σ2ant
⎞
⎠. (15)
Proof ∶
Based on (12) and (13), the total received RF power by the users and the eavesdropper can be
expanded respectively as
PEHk = (1 − ρk)⎛⎝E{
K∑
i=1
∣gHk wi (si +wEi)∣2} +E{∣nant,k∣2}⎞⎠, (16)
PEHEve = (1 − ρEve)⎛⎝E{
K∑
i=1
∣gHwwi (si +wEi)∣2} +E{∣nant,Eve∣2}⎞⎠. ∎ (17)
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
After power splitting, the k’th user and eavesdropper signal for information decoding can be
respectively rewritten as
ykID =
√
ρk(gHk wksk +E{gHk wk} sk −E{gHk wk} sk +
√
ηptg
H
k gkwEk√
M (ηptβk + qtβw + σ2)
+ gHk (Nφ∗k +
√
ηqtgwφTwφ
∗
k
)√
M (ηptβk + qtβw + σ2) wEk + g
H
k
K∑
i=1
i≠k
wi(si +wEi) + nant,k) + ns, (18)
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yEveID =
√
ρEve(gHwwksk +E{gHk wk}sk −E{gHwwk}sk
+ gHw K∑
i=1
i≠k
wisi + gHw K∑
i=1
wiwEi + nant,Eve) + ns, (19)
where ns is additional processing noise modeled as ns ∈ CN(0, σ2s).
The achievable secrecy rate is defined as [40]
RSecrecy,k = E{[Rk −REve]+} , (20)
where Rk and REve are the user and eavesdropper achievable rate, respectively.
RS,bound =
T − τ
T
log
2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 + ρkMηptβ2k/ (σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk)
ρk (Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE + βk(qtβw + σ2)
ηptβk + qtβw + σ2 + σ2ant) + σ2s
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
− T − τ
T
log2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 + ρEveMηqtβ2w/σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk
ρEve ((Kβw +∑Ki=1 Mqtβ2wσ2 + qtβw + ηptβi) (WE + 1) −
Mqtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk + σ2ant) + σ2s
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(21)
Theorem 2: By exploiting MRT precoding and MMSE channel estimation, the kth user achiev-
able secrecy rate lower bound can be represented as (21).
Proof : The proof is provided in Appendix A.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
To obtain an analytical insight, a massive MIMO system in which the number of antennas
grows sufficiently large is considered.
The asymptotic total RF power received at the k’th user and the eavesdropper can be expressed
as
P
asym
k = (1 − ρk) Mηptβ2k(ηptβk + qtβw + σ2) (WE + 1) , (22)
P
asym
Eve = (1 − ρEve) K∑
i=1
Mqtβ
2
k(ηptβk + qtβw + σ2) (WE + 1) . (23)
As it can be seen, the total RF power received at the user and eavesdropper increase by the
number of antennas. Also, the non-linear harvested energies in the asymptotic case are
Q
asym
NL, k =
Psk
exp(a × b) ×
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢⎣
1 + exp(a × b)
1 + exp (−a([P asymk −PSEN]+ − b)) − 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (T − τ), (24)
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Q
asym
NL, Eve =
PsEve
exp(a × b) × [ 1 + exp(a × b)1 + exp (−a([P asymEve −PSEN]+ − b)) − 1](T − τ), (25)
It is also seen that the non-linear harvested energy increases by the number of antennas since
it is a monotonically increasing function of the total received RF power [20]. Due to hardware
limitations, the non-linear harvested energy saturates to Psk for extreme large number of antennas.
When the number of antennas grows sufficiently large, the asymptotic secrecy rate increases with
the number of antennas and the effect of the eavesdropper can be neglected as shown in (26).
R
asym
S,bound =
T − τ
T
log
2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 +M ρkηptβ2k/(σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk)
ρk(Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE + βk(qtβw + σ2)
ηptβk + qtβw + σ2 + σ2ant) + σ2s
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
− T − τ
T
log
2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 + qtβ2w(∑Ki=1 qtβ2wηptβi + qtβw + σ2 (WE + 1) −
qtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk ) (ηptβk + qtβw + σ2)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
(26)
V. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
Since the achievable secrecy rate is a criterion to assess communication security, the achievable
secrecy rate is maximized in this section. The maximization is done subject to the required user
harvested energy that guarantees user’s proper operation (Qmin) and a constraint on eavesdrop-
per’s harvested energy for limiting its operation (Qmax). The optimization parameters are power
splitting ratio (ρk) and harvested energy allocation factor (θ). Considering the above issues, the
resulting optimization problem becomes
maximize
θ,ρk
RSecrecy,k (27a)
s.t.
QNLk ≥ Qmin (27b)
QNLEve ≤ Qmax (27c)
0 ≤ ρk ≤ 1 (27d)
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. (27e)
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Since computation of exact achievable secrecy rate in (27a) is complex, its lower bound in the
previous section can replace the objective function. Also (27c) can be replaced with θ > θmin, since
θ is in the denominator in (15) and the eavesdropper’s harvested energy is strictly decreasing
with θ. Due to the (1 − ρk) coefficient in (14), user harvested energy is strictly decreasing with
ρk. According to that and since θ > θmin, (27b) can be replaced with ρk < ρkmax . Hence, the
optimization problem in (23) can be reformulated as
maximize
θ,ρk
RS,bound (28a)
s.t.
0 ≤ ρk ≤ ρkmax (28b)
θmin ≤ θ ≤ 1. (28c)
In the feasible set of this problem, the objective function is strictly increasing with respect to
the two parameters θ and ρk (see appendix C). Hence, we conclude that the optimal value is a
point on the border of the feasible set [41]. In other words, to maximize the lower bound of the
secrecy rate, it is enough to set both the parameters of θ and ρk to their maximum, i.e., θ = 1
and ρk = ρkmax .
The harvested energy by the users is used for uplink pilot training and data processing. Since the
power consumption of data processing is relatively small, it can be neglected and we can assume
θ = 1 [15], [42], [43]. Accordingly, the optimal secrecy rate lower bound can be represented as
(29).
RS,bound optimal =
T − τ
T
log2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 + ρkmaxMQNLk β2k/ (σ2 + qtβw +QNLk βk)
ρkmax (Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE + βk(qtβw + σ2)
QNLk βk + qtβw + σ2 + σ2ant) + σ2s
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
− T − τ
T
log
2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 + ρEveMηqtβ2w/σ2 + qtβw +QNLk βk
ρEve ((Kβw +∑Ki=1 Mqtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw +QNLk βi)(WE + 1) −
Mqtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw +QNLk βk + σ2ant) + σ2s
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(29)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A single cell SWIPT enabled massive MIMO system with four users and one active eaves-
dropper is simulated. The large scale fading are modeled as βk = 10−3d
−3
k
and βw = 10−3d−3w for
13
the users and eavesdropper, respectively [16], where dk ∼ U[10,20] (meters) and dw ∼ U[10,20]
(meters) denote the kth user’s and eavesdropper’s distance from the BS [15]. The simulation
parameters are shown in Table I.
Fig. 2 shows the average user’s harvested energy versus the number of antennas at the BS for
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Coherence time: T 5 ms
Pilot sequence length: η 4
Eavesdropper power splitting ratio: ρEve 0.5
BS noise power in the training phase: σ2 -90 dBm
Receiver AWGN noise power: σ2ant -70 dBm
Processing noise power: σ2s -50 dBm
EH circuit specification: a 150
EH circuit specification: b 0.014
Maximum harvested power at the user: Psk -40dBm
Maximum harvested power at the eavesdrpper: PsEve -40dBm
EH sensitivity: PSEN 0.024 mW
Eavesdropper harvested energy allocation factor: ζ 0.5
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Fig. 2. Average user’s harvested energy versus the number of antennas at the BS, where ρk = [0.1,0.5,0.8] and θ = 0.7.
ρk = [0.1,0.5,0.8]. It can be seen that simulated and theoretical results for the user’s harvested
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Fig. 3. Average user’s harvested energy versus the fraction of energy allocated to pilot training by the user. The users and
eavesdropper distance from the BS are dk = [11,13,16,18], dw = 15, respectively and ρk = 0.4.
energy are very close to each other. Also, the results indicate the accuracy of the asymptotic
expression for the user’s harvested energy. It is observed that the amount of harvested energy
increases linearly with the number of antennas and decreases with the user power splitting ratio.
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Fig. 4. User’s achievable secrecy rate versus the fraction of energy allocated to pilot training by the user. The users and
eavesdropper distance from the BS are dk = [11,13,16,18], dw = 15, respectively and ρk = 0.4.
Fig. 3 illustrates the average user’s harvested energy versus the fraction of energy allocated
to pilot training by the user. This figure shows that the amount of harvested energy increases by
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Fig. 5. Average achievable rate at the eavesdropper versus the fraction of energy allocated to pilot training by the user. The
users, active eavesdropper and passive eavesdropper distance from the BS are dk = [11,13,16,18], dw = 15 and dpassive = 15,
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Fig. 6. Average achievable secrecy rate versus the fraction of energy allocated to pilot training by the user. The user and active
eavesdropper distances from the BS are dk = 13 and dw = 15, respectively. User power splitting ratio and eavesdropper power
splitting ratio are set ρk = 0.4 and ζ = [0.2 0.5 0.7] for the number of antennas at BS M = [200 400 800].
the fraction of energy allocated to the pilot training. In fact, increasing the allocated energy to
pilot training, channel estimation accuracy is improved and the BS provides more concentrated
beams towards the users. Thus energy is transferred more efficiently and the amount of harvested
energy by the user is increased. The figure also shows a good agreement between the theoretical
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and simulated results.
Fig. 4 shows the user’s achievable secrecy rate versus the fraction of energy allocated to
pilot training by the user. It can be observed that the achievable secrecy rate increases with the
allocated energy to pilot training, due to more accurately beamformed information signals to
the users. Furthermore, the simulated achievable secrecy rate and the obtained lower bound are
close to each other.
Fig. 5 shows the active and passive eavesdropper’s achievable rates versus the fraction of
energy allocated to the users’ uplink pilot training. Here by passive eavesdropper, we mean
an eavesdropper who does not transmit any signals and only harvests energy and decodes the
information at the downlink. This figure shows a comparison between the two cases of active and
passive eavesdropper and the effect of massive MIMO in these two cases. As can be observed,
for users that are located closer to the BS than the active eavesdropper, channel estimation and
beamforming are more accurate. Thus, the eavesdropper’s achievable rate decreases by increasing
the energy allocated to pilot training. For users where the active eavesdropper is located closer
to the BS, the eavesdropper’s achievable rate first increases due to stronger pilot training by the
eavesdropper and then decreases due to increasing the power of user pilot training. Also, it can
be seen that the passive eavesdropper’s achievable rate is extremely low, and increasing θ does
not affect it. This is due to that the passive eavesdropper does not attend in the pilot training.
Fig. 6 indicates that the eavesdropper can improve its rate and reduce the secrecy rate by
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allocating more power to its pilot phase. Also, it can be seen that by increasing the number of
antennas at the BS (i.e. enabling narrower beams toward the users), allocating more power to the
pilot phase by the eavesdropper will not improve its rate and the secrecy rate does not change
any more.
Fig. 7 shows the achievable rates versus the number of antennas at the BS. It can be seen that
in small number of antennas ( i.e. when M is small which is related to the conventional MIMO),
the user’s and eavesdropper’s achievable rate increase by the number of antennas. However, when
the number of antennas grows very large ( i.e. when M is large which is related to the Massive
MIMO), the eavesdropper rate is limited to a constant value while the user’s rate still increases
with the number of antennas. In other words, this figure shows a comparison between the results
of the proposed scheme in two cases of conventional MIMO and massive MIMO systems.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a secure SWIPT system exploiting power splitting in the downlink of a multi
user massive MIMO system with uplink pilot training was investigated. To assess the security
of communication a lower bound for the achievable secrecy rate was derived. Based on the
derived lower bound, the power splitting ratio and the fraction of harvested energy allocated
to uplink pilot training were obtained in order to maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject
to the minimum harvested energy required for the user and the maximum harvested energy for
the eavesdropper to restrict its performance. The numerical results verify the accuracy of the
obtained secrecy rate lower bound. It is revealed that massive MIMO noticeably can improve
communication security by transmitting data towards users via narrow beams.
In this paper, it is assumed that the active eavesdropper channel and the users’ channels are
independent. Assuming various degree of correlations between the channels of eavesdropper and
the users, it is interesting to investigate how this correlation could affect the eavesdropping and if
massive MIMO can prevent information leakage also in this case. It seems likely that correlation
between the channels of the eavesdropper and the users would help the eavesdropper to more
easily eavesdrop information and harvest more energy, since redirecting the signal beam toward
itself might be easier in this case.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A lower bound on achievable secrecy rate (20) is obtained as below.
E{[Rk −REve]+} a= E{max((Rk −Reaves,0)}
b
≥max (E{Rk −REve} ,0)
c
≥ E{Rk −REve} , (30)
where in (a) the achievable secrecy rate is written in another form, (b) is because of Jensen’s
inequality and (c) is because the maximum of two values is greater than or equal to each of
them.
According to (18) and (19), user and eavesdropper rate can be expressed as
Rk = E
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
T − τ
T
log2
⎛
⎝1 +
ρk ∣E{gHk wk}sk∣2
U
⎞
⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ,
where U is
U =ρk( K∑
i=1
i≠k
∣gHk wi∣2 (WE + 1) + ∣gHk wk −E{gHk wk}∣2
RRRRRRRRRRR
gHk (Nφ∗k +√ηqtgwφTwφ∗k)√
M(ηptβk + qtβw + σ2)
RRRRRRRRRRR
2
WE + σ2ant) + σ2s . (31)
Although the user knows the energy signal which is transmitted by the BS, it can not remove it
completely from the received signal due to imperfect channel state information (CSI). The third
term in U refers to this issue.
REve = E{T − τ
T
log2 (1 + ρE ∣E{gHwwk} ∣2Z )}, (32)
where Z is
Z =ρEve ( N∑
i=1
∣gwwi∣2 (WE + 1) − ∣E{gHwwk}∣2 + σ2ant) + σ2s . (33)
According to Jensen inequality a lower bound for (31) is obtained as
E
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
T − τ
T
log2
⎛
⎝1 +
ρk ∣E{gHk wk} sk∣2
U
⎞
⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ≥
T − τ
T
log2 (1 + ρk ∣E{g
H
k
wk}∣2
E{U} ). (34)
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Also an upper bound for (32) can be obtained according to the generalized Jensen’s inequality
[44]
E{T − η
T
log2 (1 + ρEve∣E{gHwwk} ∣2Z )} ≤ fracT − ηT log2 (1 + ρEve∣E{g
H
wwk} ∣2
E{Z} ) +Cσ2Z , (35)
where C =
2µ + 1
4(µ2 + µ) and µ ∈ [1,∞]. By assuming µ = 1, the maximum value of C is C = 3/8.
Also σ2Z is defined as
σ2Z = E{Z2} −E{Z}2 = ρ2EveE
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩(
N∑
i=1
∣gHwwi∣2(WE + 1)2)
2⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ − ρ
2
Eve (E{ N∑
i=1
∣gHwwi∣2(WE + 1)})
2
(36)
Some useful equations for calculating σ2Z are provided in appendix B.
By substituting the result of expectation from appendix B, σ2Z in (36) is obtained as
σ2Z = ρ
2
Eve((2Mβ2w K∑
i=1
η2p2tK(K + 1)β2i + 2ηptσ2βi
M2(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2
+ (M2 −M)β2w K∑
i=1
η2p2tβ
2
i + 2ηptσ2βi
M2(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2
+ qt(M + 1)(M + 2)(6σ2 + (M + 3)qtβw))
+ 2KδηptM(M + 1)(σ2 + (M + 2)qtβw)β2w K∑
i=1
β2i )
(WE + 1)2 +K2δM(M(5M + 11)σ2β2w
4
) − (Kβw
+ K∑
i=1
Mqtβ2w
ηptβi + qtβw + σ2 )2(WE + 1)2. (37)
As Cσ2Z is negligible compared to
T−η
T
log2 (1 + ρEve∣E{gHwwk} ∣2
E{Z} ), (35) can be written as
E{T − η
T
log
2
(1 + ρEve∣E{gHwwk} ∣2
Z
)} ≤ T − η
T
log
2
(1 + ρEve∣E{gHwwk} ∣2
E{Z} ) . (38)
By substituting obtained bounds, (34) and (38) into (30), the achievable secrecy rate lower bound
can be expressed as
E{[Rk −REve]+} ≥ T − τ
T
log
2
⎛
⎝1 +
ρk ∣E{gHk wk}∣2
E{U}
⎞
⎠ −
T − η
T
log
2
(1 − ρEve∣E{gHwwk} ∣2
E{Z} ) . (39)
Since the achievable secrecy rate is positive, the positivity of the obtained lower bound is
substantial for replacing achievable secrecy rate with its lower bound in (27a). Lower bound
positivity or negativity is not obvious and also determining its positivity or negativity is not
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Fig. 8. Positivity of secrecy rate lower bound. The secrecy rate lower bound versus harvested energy allocation factor is plotted
for various locations of the users and the active eavesdropper. dk ∼ U[10,20] (meters) and dw ∼ U[10,20] (meters).
simple. Fig. 8 shows the secrecy rate lower bound for various locations of the users and the
eavesdropper. It is almost always positive unless the eavesdropper is located near the BS and
the other users are close to the desired user and interference is strong. The secrecy rate lower
bound is negative when θ < 0.05. The negativity of the lower bound can be ignored due to its
scarce occurrence and almost always θ > 0.05.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix the first term of (36) is calculated.
E{( N∑
i=1
∣gHwwi∣2)2} = E{(gHw (A +B)gw)2} (40)
Here, A and B are defined respectively as
A =
K∑
i=1
ηptgig
H
i + gi(Nφ∗i )H + (Nφ∗i )gHi
M(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2) , (41)
B =K(ηqtgwφTwφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)HgHw + 2√ηqtNφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)HgHw +Nφ∗1(Nφ∗1)H) K∑
i=1
1
M(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2) .
(42)
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Furthermore,
E{(gHwAgw)(gHwAHgw)}
= E{∑
ij
Aijgw(i)∗gw(j) ∑
m,n
Amngw(m)gw(n)∗}
= EA {Egw {M∑
i,j
∣Ai,j ∣2∣gw(i)∣2∣gw(j)∣2 ∣A}}
= EA
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Egw
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
M∑
i=1
i=j
∣Aii∣2∣gw(i)∣4 + M∑
i≠j
∣Aij ∣2∣gw(i)∣2∣gw(j)∣2 ∣A
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭, (43)
E{Aii} = E{ k∑
k=1
(∣gk(i)∣2 + 2gk(i)∗N(i)) k∑
l=1
(∣gl(i)∣2 + 2N(i)∗gl(i))}
= E{ K∑
k=1
k=l
η2p2t ∣gk(i)∣4 +∑
k,l
∣gk(i)∣2∣gl(i)∣2 + 4 K∑
k=1
∣gk(i)∣2N(i)2}
= η2p2tK(K + 1)β2i + 4ηptσ2βi, (44)
E{Aij} = E{ K∑
k=1
(gk(i)∗gk(j) + gk(i)∗N(j) +N(i)∗gk(j)). K∑
l=1
(gl(j)∗gl(i) +N(j)∗gl(i) + gl(j)∗N(i))}
= E{ K∑
k=1
(η2p2t ∣gk(i)∣2∣gk(j)∣2 + ηpt∣gk(i)∣2∣N(j)∣2 + ηpt∣N(i)∣2∣gk(j)∣2)}
=
K∑
i=1
η2p2tβ
2
i + 2ηptσ2βi, (45)
and
E{∣gw(i)∣4} = E{(g2w,re + g2w, im)2}
= E{g4w,re + g4w, im + 2g2w,reg2w, im}
= 2β2w. (46)
By substituting (46), (44) and (45) into (43)
E{(gHwAgw)(gHwAHgw)} = 2Mβ2w K∑
i=1
η2p2tK(K + 1)β2i + 4ηptσ2βi
M2(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2
+ (M2 −M)β2w K∑
i=1
η2p2tβi + 2ηptσ2βi
M2(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2 (47)
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E{(gHwBgw)(gHwBHgw)} =K2δ(E{∣gHwNφ∗1(Nφ∗1)Hgw∣2}
+E{∣ηqtgHw gwφTwφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)HgHw gw∣2}
+ 4E{∣√ηqtgHwNφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)HgHw gw∣2}
+ 2E{ηqtgHwNφ∗1(Nφ∗1)HgwgHw gwφTwφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)HgHw gw}
+ 4E{gHwNφ∗1(Nφ∗1)Hgw√ηqtgHwNφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)HgHw gw}
+ 4E{ηqt√ηqtgHwNφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)HgHw gwgHw gwφTwφ∗1(φTwφ∗1)H
gHw gw}) = δ(6qtEgw{EN{gHwNφ∗1(Nφ∗1)Hgw ∣gHw gw∣2
∣gw}} +E{∣gHwNφ∗1 ∣4} + qtE{∣gHw gw∣4})
=K2δ(E{∣gHwNφ∗1 ∣4} + qtE{∣gHw gw∣4} + 6qtσ2E{∣gHw gw∣3})
=K2δM(qt(M + 1)(M + 2)(6σ2 + (M + 3)qtβw) + M(5M + 11)σ2β2w
4
), (48)
where δ = ∑Ki=1 1M2(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2 . E{∣gHw gw∣4} and E{∣gHw gw∣3} are respectively third and
fourth moment of a Chi-Square distribution. The Chi-square distribution moments with k degree
of freedom are given by
E{Xm} = k(k + 2)...(k + 2m − 2),
where k is the vector length. Since the eavesdropper channel vector is complex and the above
equation is for a real vector, the degree of freedom for the eavesdropper channel is assumed to
be 2M .
2E{gHwAgwgHwBHgw}
= 2Kδ(ηptE{gHwNφ∗1(Nφ∗1)HgHw gHw K∑
i=1
gig
H
i gw}
+ ηptqtE{gHw gwgHw gHw gHw K∑
i=1
gig
H
i gw})
= 2KδηptM(M + 1)(σ2 + (M + 2)qtβw)β2w K∑
i=1
β2i (49)
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By substituting (47), (48) and (49) into (40) the first term of (36) is obtained as
E{( N∑
i=1
∣gHwwi∣2)2}
= 2Mβ2w
K∑
i=1
η2p2tK(K + 1)β2i + 2ηptσ2βi
M2(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2
+ (M2 −M)β2w K∑
i=1
η2p2tβ
2
i + 2ηptσ2βi
M2(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2
+ δM(2M2σ4β4w + 2δηptM(M + 1)(σ2 + qtβw)β2w
+ qtβ3w(M + 2)(M + 4)(6(σ2 + qtβw) +Mqtβw)). (50)
APPENDIX C
The partial derivatives of the secrecy rate lower bound according to θ and ρk are detailed in
(51) and (52). As it can be seen in (51), the partial derivative according to ρk is always positive
and non-zero. Thus the secrecy rate lower bound is strictly increasing with ρk.
∂RS,bound
∂ρk
=
σ2s
ρk(ρk(Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE + βk(qtβw + σ2)
ηptβk + qtβw + σ2σ2ant) + σ2s)
(51)
∂RS,bound
∂θ
=
ρkηptβ
2
kWE(qtβw + σ2)/(ηptβk + qtβw + σ2)
(ρk(Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE + βk(qtβw + σ2)
ηptβk + qtβw + σ2 + σ2ant) + σ2s)
+ (ρk(Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE +
βk(qtβw + σ2)
ηptβk + qtβw + σ2 + σ2ant) + σ2s)(qtβw + σ2)
(ρk(Kβk + (k − 1)βkWE + βk(qtβw + σ2)
ηptβk + qtβw + σ2 + σ2ant) + σ2s)(ηptβk + qtβw + σ2)
+ −ρEve(WE + 1)∑
K
i=1
Mqt
ηpt
θ
β2wβi
(ηptβi + qtβw + σ2)2 + ρEve
Mqt
ηpt
θ
β2wβk
(ηptβk + qtβw + σ2)2
ρEve((Kβw +∑Ki=1 Mqtβ2wσ2 + qtβw + ηptβi )(WE + 1) −
Mqtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk + σ2ant) + σ2s
+
ηpt
θ
βk(ρEve((Kβw +∑Ki=1 Mqtβ2wσ2 + qtβw + ηptβi )(WE + 1) −
Mqtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk + σ2ant))
ρEve((Kβw +∑Ki=1 Mqtβ2wσ2 + qtβw + ηptβi )(WE + 1) −
Mqtβ2w
σ2 + qtβw + ηptβk + σ2ant) + σ2s
(52)
Determining the positivity of the partial derivative function according to θ is not straightforward.
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Fig. 9. Positivity of derivative function of the secrecy rate lower bound according to harvested energy allocation factor (θ).
The derivative function of secrecy rate lower bound is plotted for various locations of the users and the active eavesdropper.
dk ∼ U[10,20] (meters) and dw ∼ U[10,20] (meters).
Fig. 9 shows the positivity of the partial derivative function according to θ for various distances
of the users and eavesdropper from the BS. As it can be seen, the partial derivative function is
positive and non-zero. Therefore, the secrecy rate lower bound is strictly increasing with θk.
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